Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-1996

Nullification in the Nineties
Alan Scheflin
Santa Clara University School of Law, ascheflin@scu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
Automated Citation
Alan Scheflin, Nullification in the Nineties , 53 Guild Practitioners 95 (1996),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/682

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

ALAN W. SCHEFLIN'
NULLIFICATION IN THE NINETIES

For more than three quarters of this century, the concept of
jury nullification played virtually no role in legal scholarship.
Juries no doubt engaged in nullification behavior, but
commentators did not identify and label such conduct. Beginning
with the antiwar and liberation movements in the 1960s,
nullification has been the object of increasing legal attention with
most scholars arguing in support. Despite three decades of intense
legal debate, jury nullification is still woefully misunderstood and,
because of this misunderstanding, it has been rejected, especially
by judges.
Professor Van Dyke and I have attempted through our writings
to at least correct the misunderstandings in the hopes of clarifying
the debate. In the article reprinted in part in this issue, we began
focusing attention away from the negative idea of "nullification"
towards the more positive concept of "merciful juries." This is
more than a semantical change -- it captures the essence of the
concept and it curtails the confusion in critics' talk about juries
"negating," "disobeying," "discarding," "rejecting," "ignoring," or
"repudiating" the law. Nullification is none of those things. If a
police officer decides not to arrest, or a prosecutor, not to
prosecute, or a judge, not to let a case go forward, we do not say
that this civil servant has "disregarded" the law. If a jury,
exercising its constitutional function as the conscience of the
community, believes that a law, given to them by the judge, would
unfairly punish a defendant, they have the power and should be
instructed that they have the right not to apply that paiticular law
to this particular defendant under these particular facts. The jury
has not rewritten or disregarded the law or refused to follow its
terms. The historic function of the jury, to fit the facts to the law
as given to them by the judge, has not been violated. On the
other hand, to force jurors to apply a law in a fact situation that
offends their conscience, is to ask them to violate their oath. For
judges to refuse to instruct juries about nullification in the small
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percentage of cases where nullification would apply is to engage
in judicial deception.
Because nullification allows moves in favor of acquittal,
prosecutors have naturally resisted it. For a recent example, see
the brief, but poorly reasoned, opinion by the California Attorney
General rejecting nullification.'
Since the article by Professor Van Dyke and me was written,
nullification still has failed to persuade judges, though legislators
are beginning to recognize its populist value and appeal. Through
the media, more potential jurors are learning about nullification.
Unfortunately, their concepts of what it is, and what it is not, are
so varied that there is a real danger that juries will produce the
anarchy judges fear, not because of nullification, but rather
because of the continued judicial refusal to give accurate
instructions about it.
An even more serious problem exists in the aftermath of the
infamous Simpson case and other high visibility cases in which
juries refused to convict on any, or on the most serious, charges.
Rapidly replacing the idea of "merciful" juries is the growing
concern about "gullible" juries. Attacks on the vitality of the jury
system itself have intensified as a consequence. Juries are
instructed to provide the defendant the benefit of the doubt. Now
that they are doing it, critics claim that they should have ignored
the law and been more bloodthirsty. There is a sad irony in the
fact that the more juries exercise their historical role to weigh the
evidence, give the defendant the benefit of reasonable doubt, and
act as the conscience of the community, the greater the call for
them to disregard the law, ignore the facts, and convict.
The jury was fashioned to protect citizens from the
overreaching of government. Now public prejudice is reshaping
the role of the jury so that it must protect us from our own
individual rights. Unless the trend is stopped and nullification
reasserted, it will turn juries into vigilante groups. As we close
out the nineties, the effort to protect nullification has gotten
harder. Now the fight includes protecting the role of the jury as
originally conceived. Few fights in the coming years will be more
significant.
1. Ops. Atty. Gen. of Cal., Op. 93-1206 (May 24, 1994).
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